Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Elucidation of some points in E.Schröder', 'Conditionals (Stanf)' and 'Philosophy of Language'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts

23 ideas

4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 2. Tools of Propositional Logic / c. Derivation rules of PL
14273 Conditional Proof is only valid if we accept the truth-functional reading of 'if' [Edgington]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 3. Types of Set / b. Empty (Null) Set
14238 A class is an aggregate of objects; if you destroy them, you destroy the class; there is no empty class [Frege]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / d. Singular terms
7755 Singular terms refer, using proper names, definite descriptions, singular personal pronouns, demonstratives, etc. [Lycan]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 6. Probability
14281 A thing works like formal probability if all the options sum to 100% [Edgington]
14284 Conclusion improbability can't exceed summed premise improbability in valid arguments [Edgington]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / b. Types of conditional
14270 Simple indicatives about past, present or future do seem to form a single semantic kind [Edgington]
14269 Maybe forward-looking indicatives are best classed with the subjunctives [Edgington]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / c. Truth-function conditionals
14275 Truth-function problems don't show up in mathematics [Edgington]
14274 Inferring conditionals from disjunctions or negated conjunctions gives support to truth-functionalism [Edgington]
14276 The truth-functional view makes conditionals with unlikely antecedents likely to be true [Edgington]
14290 Doctor:'If patient still alive, change dressing'; Nurse:'Either dead patient, or change dressing'; kills patient! [Edgington]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / d. Non-truthfunction conditionals
14271 Non-truth-functionalist say 'If A,B' is false if A is T and B is F, but deny that is always true for TT,FT and FF [Edgington]
14272 I say "If you touch that wire you'll get a shock"; you don't touch it. How can that make the conditional true? [Edgington]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / e. Supposition conditionals
14282 On the supposition view, believe if A,B to the extent that A&B is nearly as likely as A [Edgington]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / f. Pragmatics of conditionals
14278 Truth-functionalists support some conditionals which we assert, but should not actually believe [Edgington]
14287 Does 'If A,B' say something different in each context, because of the possibiites there? [Edgington]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
7768 The truth conditions theory sees meaning as representation [Lycan]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 5. Meaning as Verification
7766 Meaning must be known before we can consider verification [Lycan]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 6. Meaning as Use
7763 It is hard to state a rule of use for a proper name [Lycan]
7764 Could I successfully use an expression, without actually understanding it? [Lycan]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 6. Truth-Conditions Semantics
7770 Truth conditions will come out the same for sentences with 'renate' or 'cordate' [Lycan]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 8. Possible Worlds Semantics
7773 A sentence's truth conditions is the set of possible worlds in which the sentence is true [Lycan]
7774 Possible worlds explain aspects of meaning neatly - entailment, for example, is the subset relation [Lycan]